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Legal Opinion on National Reservations to the MAI
Barry Appleton LL.B, LL.M
Appleton & Associates International
Lawyers
November 14, 1997
Re: Reservations to the proposed Multilateral Agreement
on Investment
You have requested our legal opinion regarding the making of reservations by the
Government of Canada to the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment currently being
negotiated by the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). In particular, you asked us to answer the following questions:
1. What are reservations to international treaties, how are they made
and interpreted?
2. How could potential Canadian proposed reservations for healthcare, public
education, culture and the environment be interpreted by an international tribunal?
Based on the foregoing and having regard to the legal assumptions and considerations
that we deem relevant, we are of the opinion that:
Reservations are unilateral statements made by governments stating that they will not
be bound to an international treaty obligation. Reservations to multilateral agreements
like the MAI can only be made in the manner specified by the terms of the particular
treaty. It is important to note that not all government activities are capable of
reservation under international treaties.
Reservations are a form of exception to international treaty commitments and are
interpreted narrowly by international courts and tribunals. Great care must be taken in
the making of reservations as they will be interpreted strictly by international
tribunals.
(a) Canada's proposed reservation to protect social services such as health and public
education is inadequate to permit provincial governments to continue to provide these
services without compensating affected foreign investors and governments. This reservation
contains provisions which may unduly limit the financial ability of governments to provide
services such as health, public education and childcare.
(b) Canada has not yet proposed a reservation to protect culture or cultural
industries. In light of the decision of recent international trade tribunals, this is an
important area for reservation and leaves Canada exposed to challenge from foreign
governments and foreign investors.
(c) Canada has not proposed any reservations to the MAI to permit it to take measures
to protect or conserve the Canadian environment. Thus, the MAI could reduce the financial
capacity of governments to freely engage in these activities.
QUESTION ONE: WHAT ARE RESERVATIONS TO
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, HOW ARE THEY MADE AND INTERPRETED?
 
Reservations Defined
Reservations to international treaties are a long-established diplomatic custom. Put
simply, the making of a reservation allows a country to be bound by an international
treaty while attempting to be excused from some specific requirement. Thus, reservations
allow a country to rewrite certain treaty obligations as they will affect that country. In
essence, reservations are special forms of exceptions to international agreements. A
reservation differs from an exception in that an exception applies to all signatories to a
treaty and is contained in the treaty's text.(1)
By comparison, reservations apply only to the country making them and are generally only
found with the "instruments of ratification" of a particular treaty or in an
annex to the treaty.
The general rule of treaty law is summarized by the Latin phrase "pacta
sunt servanda," which means that treaties must be observed.(2) Since a reservation permits a country to
not observe a specific treaty obligation, it constitutes a violation of this rule.
Traditionally, reservations were therefore only permitted if each and every member of a
treaty agreed to the reservation. However, within the last forty years, international
practice has changed.(3)
Reservations are now permitted as unilateral statements made during the negotiation of
a treaty. The international treaty that governs the formation and interpretation of
treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, defines a reservation as:
a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing,
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or
to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to
that State.(4)
Because reservations contemplate a violation of the pacta sunt servanda
rule, international law has placed certain limits upon reservations. Article 19 of the Vienna
Convention states that:
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservations in questions, be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
The May 14, 1997(5) version of the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI") is currently under negotiation.
While part IX of the MAI is entitled "RESERVATIONS," it currently does not
contain a process that permits the making of reservations by its signatory countries. All
that is certain is that the current draft contemplates the making of reservations--which
is an important factor based on the Vienna Convention.
The MAI does contemplate a process known as standstill and rollback. Standstill refers
to governments agreeing not to ever take new measures that would impair the interests of
foreign investors and their investments. Rollback refers to a mechanism where existing
inconsistent measures, such as reservations, will be reduced and eventually removed over
time. Reservation lists provide very convenient starting points for future rollback
negotiations and often reservations themselves provide for their own rollback through
"phase-out" provisions.
How Reservations Are Made
There are a number of important considerations about the making of the reservations to the
MAI that have yet to be negotiated. The MAI lacks a list of obligations that can be
reserved against and a process for the making and interpretation of the reservation. This
lack of a process is problematic for anyone attempting to understand the MAI as the
wording of what can be reserved can often be as important as the wording of the
reservations themselves.
In the GATT, 1947, there was no specific mention of reservations. As a result,
the making of each reservation required the acceptance of every other GATT member.(6) Nearly fifty years later in the NAFTA,
there was a specific process that permitted the making of unilateral reservations.
In the NAFTA, countries were entitled to list reservations from a number of treaty
obligations regarding investment, trade in services and financial services. The NAFTA
reservation process required that there be a listing of measures within the NAFTA annexes
at a specified time(7) with all
reservations proposed after that time being invalid.
Bound versus Unbound Reservations
In the NAFTA there were two different types of reservations permitted against investment
obligations: bound and unbound. This terminology comes from the custom of international
trade negotiations where a country would be required to reduce tariffs by a specific
amount. In this context, each tariff concession became known as a "binding."(8) Thus a bound reservation permits a
government to maintain a specific existing non-conforming measure which would otherwise
violate a treaty obligation. Governments are locked into a specific type of conduct and
while they are permitted to amend these measures in future, they never can do so in a way
that is less "trade-liberalizing." Unbound reservations differ from bound ones
as they permit governments to not only maintain the existing non-conforming measures, but
they allow the making of new ones in the future. In other words, unbound reservations
permit governments the broadest ability to act under an international agreement including
introducing measures which are more trade restrictive.
The commentary to part IX of the MAI indicates that there is agreement for having bound
reservations to the MAI but there is some debate between counties as to whether there
should be unbound reservations permitted as "such a provision might undermine the MAI
disciplines to which it applied."(9)
Under either bound or unbound reservations, the type of government activity that can be
reserved under the NAFTA is exceedingly broad. The NAFTA defines the term
"measures" to include "laws, regulations, procedures, requirements or
practices." By comparison, there is no similar definition of the term
"measures" under the MAI.
Specific versus Sectoral Reservations
The reservation process within a multilateral treaty will set out how specific a
reservation has to be. For example, in the NAFTA, the bound reservations in Annex I were
required to be very specific by listing the existing non-conforming government measure.
The unbound reservations in Annex II were broader in nature as only sectors of the economy
(such as telecommunications) needed to be listed. By using sectoral reservations,
negotiators are easily able to preserve a much larger area of government policy authority
than if they are required to list every specific government measure in the area.
In the NAFTA, Canada took unbound sectoral reservations for :
- aboriginal affairs;(10)
- residency requirements attached to the ownership of oceanfront land;(11)
- telecommunication transport networks and services, radio-communications and submarine
cables (i.e. "basic" telecommunication services);(12)
- minority affairs;(13) and
- law enforcement, corrections and specific aspects of social services.(14)
Reservable Obligations
In the NAFTA, investment reservations could only be taken against the following specific
NAFTA investment obligations:
- National Treatment
- Most-Favoured-Nation Status
- Performance Requirements
- Senior Management and Boards of Directors
Thus, under the NAFTA, a government could not make any reservation to the Investment
Chapter obligations regarding the payment of compensation on expropriation, the regulation
of transfers, meeting international minimum standards of treatment or lowering standards
to attract investment. In the MAI, it will be very important to understand against what
obligations governments will be entitled to reserve. If the MAI permits reservations
against expropriation, there will be a significant difference in coverage between
investment agreements like the NAFTA and the MAI. The failure to permit the making of
reservations to expropriation obligations, on the other hand, may severely restrict
government policy making ability.
In addition, the definition of the types of reservable government action is important. In
the NAFTA , governments were entitled to reserve against a broad variety of governmental
activity which included laws, regulations, decisions of administrative bodies, policies of
governments and even the discretionary actions of officials. The MAI does not contain any
definition of what measures will be covered. The commentary to part IX of the MAI
indicates that there is disagreement regarding which MAI obligations would be reservable.(15) Without such a definition, it is
difficult for governments to be able to make effective reservations or governments may
believe that they have effectively reserved policies but later find that such policies are
not reservable.(16)
Treaty Interpretation
The reservation process must be assessed in the context of how reservations are
interpreted. Since the purpose of reservations are to enable a government to maintain
non-conforming actions in future, it is essential that the reservation wording be
carefully reviewed.
The International Law of Treaty Interpretation.
The international rules of treaty interpretation have been set out in articles 31 and 32
of the Vienna Convention. Article 31 states:
General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
b) Any instrument which was made by one of more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty
or the application of its provisions;
b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
The Ordinary Meaning
Article 31(1) requires a treaty to be interpreted in its ordinary meaning and in
light of its object and purpose. The textual approach suggests that the words of the text
be given their ordinary meaning, which may be established through the study and analysis
of the text. This view was endorsed by the International Court of Justice when it was
considering the Charter of the United Nations. The Court held:
The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal which is called
upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to
them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the
relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is
an end of the matter.(17)
Article 31(1) also calls for a teleological interpretation--which means that a treaty
must be given a meaning consistent with the object and purposes as a whole.(18)
 
Interpreting the MAI
The MAI does not define its objects and purposes. The MAI, unlike other international
agreements such as the NAFTA, does not contain a special section setting out the
objectives of the agreement. Thus, the preamble of the MAI became the main vehicle
relating the objects and purposes of the MAI. The predominant purpose of the MAI is the
fostering of fair, transparent and predictable regulation of foreign investment.
While under the MAI, the preamble language does not create any binding international
obligations. The preamble provides an interpretive context for the entire agreement under
the international rules of treaty interpretation. Thus, even if the words of the preamble
are not binding, they will have an important interpretive effect on the entire agreement.
The preamble to the MAI establishes the framework through which this agreement should be
interpreted. It reads:
The Contracting Parties to this AGREEMENT,
Desiring to strengthen their ties of friendship and to promote greater economic
co-operation between them;
Considering that international investment has assumed great importance in the world
economy and has considerably contributed to the development of their countries;
Recognizing that AGREEMENT upon the treatment to be accorded to investors and their
investments will contribute to the efficient utilization of economic resources, the
creation of employment opportunities and the improvement of living standards;
Emphasizing that fair, transparent and predictable investment regimes complement and
benefit the world trading system;
[Wishing that this AGREEMENT enhances international co-operation with respect to
investment and the development of world-wide rules on foreign direct investment in the
framework of the world trading system as embodied in the World Trade Organization.]
Wishing to establish a broad multilateral framework for international investment with high
standards for the liberalization of investment regimes and investment protection and with
effective dispute settlement procedures;
[Resolved to implement this AGREEMENT in a manner consistent with environmental protection
and conservation;]
[Reaffirming their commitment to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and
Agenda 21, including to sustainable development as reflected therein,]
[and recognizing that investment, as an engine of economic growth, can play a key role in
ensuring that growth is sustainable, when accompanied by appropriate environmental
policies to ensure it takes place in an environmentally sound manner];
[Renewing their commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour
standards [i.e. freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively,
prohibition of forced labour, the elimination of exploitative forms of child labour, and
non-discrimination in employment] [and noting that the International Labour Organization
is the competent body to set and promote core labour standards world-wide.]]
Affirming their decision to create a free-standing AGREEMENT open to accession by all
countries;
[OECD Guidelines]
When looked at together, the preamble creates an agreement that is predominantly
concerned with the predictable protection of foreign investment and investors. This is the
general objective and purpose that a tribunal interpreting the MAI would keep in mind.
Preparatory Works
Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that one can look to the
"preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion" in
order to confirm the textual interpretation of the treaty. It is unknown whether there is
any travaux préparatoires being maintained for the MAI, or if one is maintained whether
it will be made public. Should it become public, it may be instrumental in interpreting
any provision in question. At this point, the commentary to the MAI may provide
interpretive assistance as a supplementary tool under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention
but it does not constitute a travaux préparatoires.
Subsequent Agreement of the Parties
Article 31(3) allows interpreters to take into account subsequent agreements or practice
of the parties after the conclusion of agreements. However, for such practice to apply for
a multilateral agreement, it would be necessary to demonstrate that all parties to the MAI
shared the practice or assented to the document.
Particular Definitions
Article 31(4) allows the Parties to ascribe a particular definition to a word or phrase
used in the treaty.
Supplementary Interpretation
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention which may be employed should there still be any doubt
as to the meaning. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allows for a supplementary means of
interpretation when the usual rules of interpretation prove to be inconclusive. Article 32
reads:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31:
a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure: or
b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Reservations to the MAI will be interpreted in accordance with these complicated
rules of international law. In order to reduce this complexity, the NAFTA contained
specific rules for the interpretation of reservations. These rules generally provided for
an interpretive hierarchy where the descriptive element of a reservation would be used to
qualify the actual listing of the measure.
The absence of these rules from the MAI will make it more difficult for governments to
be able to effectively use reservations to permit them to maintain otherwise inconsistent
measures.
Presumptions
International law has a special interpretive principle for the interpretation of
exceptions. This rule is expressed in Latin as exceptio est strictissimae
applicationis which means exceptions to treaty obligations are construed
restrictively.(19) Similarly, within the
decisions of the GATT and the WTO, exceptions to trade obligations have been narrowly
interpreted.(20) Reservations operate as
"mini-exceptions" to a treaty and their use always creates tension between the
liberalizing goals of the treaty and the competing goal of maintaining effective
government policy tools. These competing goals are likely to lead to disputes as the views
of foreign investors may often be different than that of the host government. Despite the
protestations of governments when making or when relying upon reservations that they are
broad, reservations will be strictly and narrowly interpreted by international tribunals.
 
QUESTION TWO: HOW COULD POTENTIAL CANADIAN PROPOSED
RESERVATIONS FOR HEALTHCARE, PUBLIC EDUCATION, CULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT BE INTERPRETED
BY AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL?
Canada's Reservations
In a document entitled "CANADA: DRAFT RESERVATIONS,"(21) the Canadian federal government proposed
to make a number of reservations to the MAI. These reservations appear to be identical to
reservations made by Canada under the NAFTA however there are significant differences in
the effect of the MAI reservations because of the difference in wording between the
wording of obligations in the MAI and the NAFTA.
Healthcare, Public Education & Childcare
In this draft reservation document, Canada has made the following sectoral
reservation for social services:
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure with
respect to the provision of public law enforcement and correctional services, and the
following services to the extent that they are social services established or maintained
for a public purpose: income security or insurance, social security or insurance, social
welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care.
Canada's MAI obligations will affect all levels of government in Canada. However, this
reservation only permits the federal government to take actions that are otherwise
inconsistent with the MAI. Despite the fact that most social services are provided by
province and municipal governments, Canada has not taken any measure to protect them
against the obligations of the MAI. This would result in making public education provided
by provincial and local governments subject to the MAI without any relief. Similarly,
provincially-provided health care, child care and training programs would be covered by
the obligations of the MAI while federally delivered programs (such as those delivered on
military bases or for aboriginal persons) would be covered by the reservation.
This wording of the description part of Canada's MAI reservation is identical to the
reservation taken by Canada at II-C-9 in the NAFTA and substantially identical to the
Mexican and American reservation at II-U-5 and at II-M-11.(22)
On careful review however, it is apparent that Canada's reservation to the MAI for social
services is significantly smaller than Canada's reservation under the NAFTA since it only
applies to the federal level.
While the failure to exempt provincial programs is an obvious flaw in Canada's
reservation, even if the MAI reservation were to be identical to the NAFTA one, there
still are significant issues relating to the actual protection provided by this
reservation. While the reservation purports in its title to cover social services, it
actually only totally covers the provision of public law enforcement and correctional
services. All the other areas covered by this reservation are qualified as they are only
covered to the extent that they are "social services established or maintained for a
public purpose."
These terms are not defined by the MAI. This leaves a significant
interpretative question open as to the scope of this reservation. This is particularly
important due to differences in approach among governments within the OECD. For example,
Canadian provinces have long maintained health care as a public social service. In other
OECD jurisdictions, such as Mexico or the United States, these activities are delivered
almost exclusively by the private sector or are not accessible to all. Similarly, public
education is only delivered at the primary level in Mexico as a public service and as a
commercial service after that point.
The concern over the meaning of the term "social service" can be
seen from the position of the U.S. government. In a letter advising American state
governments on what to reserve as a social service under the NAFTA social service
reservation, the U.S. government suggested that social services provided by for-profit
providers were not social services.(23)
According to the U.S. government, such for-profit providers can transform the service from
a "social service" to a commercial service. These American guidelines state:
[NAFTA] Chapters 11 and 12 only apply to the provision of "government
services" (i.e. law enforcement, correctional services, social welfare etc.) by NAFTA
investors/service providers if the state allows private providers to offer similar
services on a commercial basis.(24)
Since the proposed MAI reservation deals with a sectoral reservation, the
adoption of such a definition could render Canada's reservation to be virtually
meaningless for health, public education and childcare as each has aspects provided by
commercial providers in Canada.
Without having any specified meanings, it is necessary to rely upon the
international rules of treaty interpretation to give meaning to this MAI reservation. Such
a process would be unpredictable and any government relying only on such a non-specific
definition would do so at its peril. For example, one can look to the general usage of the
terms used in the reservation. An examination of the definitions of social service and
public purpose is instructive of their meaning.
 
Social Services
This term is capable of a number of different definitions. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines the term "social service" as:
A service supplied for the benefit of the community, especially any of
those provided by the central or local government, such as education, medical treatment,
social welfare, etc.
The Webster's American Encyclopaedic Dictionary gives a much narrower definition:
organized welfare efforts carried on under professional auspices by trained personnel.
There is no definition of the term "social service" in the decisions on
international courts and tribunals. All that one can surmise from the term is that it
refers to services that provide public welfare benefits. The indication from the U.S.
Trade Representatives Office that these same social services could change into commercial
services if provided by for-profit providers suggests that the term has significant
limits.
Public Purpose
The term public purpose is not defined in the MAI but it appears in the
expropriation provision as an expropriation may only occur if it is taken for a public
purpose. In this context, the phrase public purpose has been discussed extensively, as has
the analogous terms public use, public policy or its civil law equivalent, ordre public.
The term ordre public was examined by the International Court of Justice in the Boll Case.
In the separate opinion of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, he stated:
[ I]n the sphere of private international law the exception of ordre public,
or public policy, as a reason for the exclusion of foreign law in a particular case is
generally--or, rather, universally--recognised. It is recognised in various forms, with
various degrees of emphasis, and, occasionally, with substantive differences in the matter
of its application. ... On the whole, the result is the same in most countries--so much so
that the recognition of the part of ordre public must be recognised as a general
principle in the field of private international law ...(25)
A recent treatise done under the auspices of the World Bank's International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes found that the term "public purpose" is
used in a number of international economic treaties. The authors conclude that
"public purpose will to a considerable extent rest with the state concerned."(26) One international law expert (in a book
edited by the former President of the International Court of Justice) states:
Because determination of the public or national interest in any specific situation
can only be effected by the State concerned, it is hardly conceivable that it can be
reviewed or contested by another organ.(27)
Thus, one must conclude that the term "public purpose" is very broad
and will permit Parliament to decide what is in Canada's national interest. This
determination would be very difficult for another country to challenge.
Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, we are able to conclude that there is a
considerable amount of uncertainty in the meaning to be given to the words of the Social
Service Reservation, especially for the phrase social service. Despite the use of the
broad term "public purpose" in the Social Service Reservation, this will not
extend the scope of coverage of this reservation. The term "social service" is
much more limited in scope and it will limit the usefulness of the reservation. The
definition of this term will need to reflect the varied backgrounds of OECD members such
as Turkey, Mexico, the United States, Germany and Japan. The MAI does not set out any
meaning for this term and it has not been the basis of any international court review.
Accordingly, we can only be certain of the simple fact that there is no clear definition
for this term. This is especially problematic because of the differences in how OECD
governments actually provide these social services and the fact that there is a different
definition in use by the U.S. Government.
In our opinion the protection for the provision of health, public education
and other social services under the MAI is inadequate. If Canada is to rely upon an
MAI reservation that will be identical to its NAFTA Social Service Reservation, then this
reservation will not be broad enough to cover important obligations such as expropriation.
1. The wording of the reservation is ambiguous and qualified. We believe
that this reservation could be reworded to provide fuller protection for the social
services it wishes to cover.
2. The reservation does not extend protection to provincial or local
governments who primarily provide social services such as health care, primary and
secondary education or child care.
All that we can conclude is that there is significant uncertainty in this
term and that governments should take prudent measures to best protect themselves from any
future narrow reading of this term by a panel.
 
Culture
The Government of Canada did not make any reservations in its proposed
reservations for the area of culture. Culture and cultural industries are an area that
would be significantly affected by the obligations of the MAI. Government measures that
attempted to maintain, develop or foster made-in-Canada culture would be inconsistent with
the goals of the MAI. Any policy or program(28)
that advantaged Canadian culture or content directly or indirectly, would run afoul of the
national treatment or performance requirements obligations. Examples of the government
policies that would conflict with the MAI include:
1. Policies taken to create a Canadian film distribution policy that would link
domestic sales to domestic film production would contravene the performance requirement
provisions of the MAI.
2. Policies that support Canadian movie and television productions by requiring
the involvement of a Canadian broadcaster or distributor.
3. Programs that look at the prior use of Canadian programs as a criteria for
accessing future benefits.
4. Advantages to print publications containing Canadian content such as the
postal subsidy.
5. Requirements compelling a specific percentage of Canadian content in
programming for television, radio or cinema.
6. Licensing decisions that favour Canadians for telecommunications services,
broadcasting access or preferential channel line-ups.
Each of these specific examples would require coverage by a specific
reservation to the MAI or by an exception. Otherwise, the Government of Canada would be
liable to compensate foreign investors who were denied access to Canada or were otherwise
harmed by these "MAI-illegal" policies to promote and preserve Canadian culture.
The recognition that the principle of free trade is inconsistent with the goal
of cultural protection has been recognized by the Government of France. Contained in an
Annex to the MAI is a proposal from the Government of France entitled "INTRODUCTION
OF AN EXCEPTION CLAUSE FOR CULTURAL INDUSTRIES."(29)
This exception reads:
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent any Contracting
Party to take any measure to regulate investment of foreign companies and the conditions
of activity of these companies, in the framework of policies designed to preserve and
promote cultural and linguistic diversity.
This proposed exception differs from the "cultural exemption"
contained in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement which reads:
1. Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this agreement,
except as specifically provided in Article 401 (Tariff Elimination), paragraph 4 of
Article 1607 (divestiture of an indirect acquisition) and Articles 2006 and 2007 of this
Chapter.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, a Party may take measures of
equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that would have been inconsistent with
this Agreement but for paragraph 1.(30)
The NAFTA incorporated this earlier bilateral exemption by incorporating it into NAFTA
Annex 2106 and providing that the rights and obligations under the earlier agreement were
the same as the ones in the NAFTA. Thus, new NAFTA obligations such as the protection of
intellectual property rights or investor-state dispute settlement cannot be invoked for
cultural industries.
The FTA cultural exemption is different from most exemptions in international
agreements as it does not exempt the measures it contemplates. It merely states that
retaliation for the measures taken will be done under other agreements. In fact, this is
what occurred when the United States government successfully challenged Canadian magazine
publishing rules before the WTO in 1997.(31)
Investment issues abound in the area of culture. Obligations within the
MAI such as national treatment, performance requirements and expropriation all can be used
to prevent governments from creating or maintaining culture policies to enhance
distinctive domestic cultures. Indeed, on the basis of the WTO appellate decision on
Canadian magazines, Canadian cultural policies such as the postal subsidy would violate
the national treatment rules proposed in the MAI. Similar concerns could also arise from
policies over the creation of a national film distribution scheme or by the widespread
practice of basing arts funding on previous local activity. Trade tribunals have come to
the conclusion that Canadian cultural products are fungible and interchangeable with
products from other countries. To an international tribunal, Macleans magazine is
considered to be the same as American publications such as Newsweek. Thus, international
trade agreements have viewed domestic policies which encourage domestic cultural products
to be impediments to global trade.
Conclusion
The exception proposed by the Government of France seems to be broad enough to
provide protection for Canadian culture, however, any reduction in the scope of this
exception would leave Canadian culture at risk. Powerful lobbies in OECD countries do not
support this exception as it would mark a retreat in the level of international protection
for global cultural industries from the NAFTA.
If Canada were to find a less extensive cultural exception, it would need to make a
number of reservations to the MAI in an attempt to protect Canadian cultural policies and
programs. It has been the public position of the Government of Canada that it will take
actions to protect Canadian culture from the effects of the MAI. Given this position, it
is surprising not to find a proposed listing of general unbound reservations for culture
in Canada's MAI reservations to provide specific acknowledgment that culture is fully
protected from the effects of the MAI.
 
The Environment
The tension between free trade and environmental protection has never been
greater as governments have been forced to deal with the seemingly conflicting goals of
accommodating environmental concerns while still expanding trade liberalization. Attempts
by states to address environmental issues have often run into two problems: either the
measure taken by the government has been accused of constituting an arbitrary means of
discriminating against non-nationals; or in dealing with a problem that extends beyond the
geographic borders of the country, the measure has attempted to impose burdens upon
foreign entities as well as on domestic ones.
The conflict between trade and the environment is complicated by a lack of
international consensus on environmental measures. This lack of international consensus
has often resulted in countries taking unilateral measures to deal with environmental
issues that are critical to them.(32)
Against the backdrop of countries finding an increasing need for taking environmental
measures, one finds an ever expanding framework of international trade agreements.
Except for a very specific exemption from the performance requirements obligations, the
MAI does not contain any environmental exceptions. Further, Canada has not included any
reservations within the MAI that would permit governments to take measures to conserve and
protect the Canadian environment. The environmental exemption in the MAI permits a
government to require domestic content or provide a preference to local goods or services
only if:
- the measure is not arbitrary or unjustifiable;
- is not a disguised restriction on investment; and
- is necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or is necessary for the conservation
of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.
The MAI does not contain any general exception clause that would clearly
permit governments to take environmental measures that could otherwise offend the many
other obligations in the MAI. Without the inclusion of broad easily accessed exceptions or
reservations, the MAI's broad investment rules may result in new limits on the ability of
governments to freely meet environmental challenges. There are a number of types of
environmental measures that could trigger liability on the part of governments under the
MAI. Some of these measures might include:
Remediation orders to prevent toxic seepage.
Changes to existing concession licenses to protect fisheries, flora or fauna.
Changes to land use regulations that would reduce the value of property for a
foreign investor.
Preventative measures taken to protect public safety that caused loss
or harm to foreign investors.
Requirements that only environmentally-acceptable resource extraction
techniques be used that would increase the cost of extraction.
The Experience of Environmental Exceptions in Trade Agreements
It has been suggested that there will be no need to make reservations to the MAI for the
environment because the agreement may contain a number of environmental exceptions.
However the use of environmental exceptions in international trade agreements has
demonstrated that they are not an effective means for governments to take measures to
protect the environment.
GATT panels have interpreted these GATT exceptions narrowly. One of the key concerns
over the use of GATT exceptions is their effect which can lead to the distortion of
international trade. Thus, measures taken by a country which arguably overshoot their
purpose have not been accepted to fit within the trade law exceptions.
For example, to justify an environmental measure governments must prove the
"necessity" of a measure. This term was examined in some detail during the GATT
Panel on Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act. The panel held that a party could not justify
its measure as being "necessary" if there could be an alternative measure which
could reasonably be expected to be used and which was not inconsistent with GATT
obligations. Furthermore, if no GATT-consistent measure was reasonably available to the
government, it would be necessary to choose a measure that had the "least degree of
inconsistency with other GATT provisions."(33)
In essence, the GATT established that in order to rely on a GATT exception, it is up to
the justifying party to establish that the measure was the least-trade burdensome
alternative available.
The necessary test was examined when Thailand attempted to rely on GATT Article XX(b) to
ban foreign cigarettes. The Thai Government imposed an import ban, quantitative import
restrictions and discriminatory internal taxes on foreign cigarettes. This issue was
raised to a GATT panel which ruled that these broad measures were not consistent with the
GATT Article XX(b) exception.(34) The
Panel accepted the fact that smoking constituted a serious risk to human health, however
the panel did not find that the Thai actions were necessary.(35)
A similar situation was considered in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement panel on
Herring and Salmon,(36) where Canada
argued that its export prohibition was made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production, namely, strict domestic production controls limiting the amount of
fish caught. The Panel agreed that Canada's fish harvest limitations constituted a
restriction on domestic production within the meaning of the GATT Article XX(g). However,
in this case, the Panel ruled that the measure was not reasonable as it put too onerous a
burden on American fishery workers who had to land their entire catch in Canada for
inspection. The panel did suggest that a landing requirement of 20-30% of the catch would
have been reasonable under the circumstances.
Finally, in the American Tuna-Dolphin case,(37)
a GATT panel dealt with the issue of extra-territoriality. In this case, the U.S.
Government passed a law, the Marine Mammal Protection Act,(38)
which imposed a ban on all tuna caught by countries using nets that incidentally killed
dolphins at a rate 1.25 times higher than the rate of American boats operating in the same
waters at the same time.(39) The
Government of Mexico challenged this measure as being an import ban that was contrary to
GATT Articles XI and XX. Mexico also protested the measure as an extra-territorial
regulation of its fishing industry.
The GATT panel hearing this case agreed with Mexico in that the U.S. measure attempted to
impose American jurisdiction in areas outside of its jurisdiction. Based on the drafting
history of the GATT Article XX exceptions, the Panel held that the GATT Article XX(b)
exception could not be used to protect the environment outside of U.S. territory.
Furthermore, the panel also ruled on the "necessary" requirement of the GATT
Article XX exceptions. They held that the measure had to be necessary to the product and
not to its production process. In other words, the United States could ban all tuna, but
not tuna captured by a certain method.
The second GATT Article XX exception that could relate to the environment is Article
XX(g). This exception permits Parties to take measures "relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources." The 1988 GATT panel on Herring and Salmon (40) held that the term "relating
to" meant that the measure had to be primarily aimed at conservation. While this
appears to be less strenuous than the "necessary" test contained in Article
XX(b), it still imposes a significant burden.
Precautionary Principle
The MAI may include a reference to the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development and Agenda 21 in its preamble. Incorporated in the Rio Declaration is the
precautionary principle which states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
In order to comply with the precautionary principle, a government measure must:
(i) be in response to a threat of serious or irreversible damage to the
environment;
(ii) be cost-effective;
(iii) be for the purpose of preventing environmental degradation;
(iv) involve some degree of scientific certainty; and
(v) be within the capabilities of the government.
The Rio Declaration is not legally binding. It is a statement of principles based on
Agenda 21 and according to which Agenda 21 is to be carried out.(41) As a mere declaration, it has not been
signed by any country. Agenda 21 is not legally binding as it states its intention
"[t]o promote, through the gradual development of universally and multilaterally
negotiated agreements or instruments, international standards for the protection of the
environment . . . [and] . . . to ensure the effective, full and prompt implementation of
legally binding instruments."(42)
The Permanent Court of International Justice has held that a treaty provision must take
precedence over a general rule of international law.(43)
This principle was reflected in the recent WTO Panel Report on EC Beef Hormones. In this
decision, the Panel held that the precautionary principle could not be used to override
the explicit wording of the treaty obligations.(44)
Thus, without a clearly stated broad exception or reservation, the investment obligations
of the MAI will override environmental measures taken by governments.
Conclusion
The goal of environmental protection has suffered from every decision taken by
international trade tribunals. This history of loss, including cases involving Canada,
clearly indicates that the present wording of environmental exceptions in the WTO
Agreement is inadequate. The MAI fails to even meet the same level of environmental
exceptions as the WTO.
Canada has failed to propose reservations to protect the ability of governments to take
environmental measures that would otherwise violate the MAI. As a result, Canada has
chosen to voluntarily bind itself, its provinces and its municipalities to obligations
which protect investments over the environment.
Assumptions
In coming to our opinion, we have consulted the provisions of the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), the May 14, 1997 English version of the
MAI and other relevant international and municipal legal materials. This opinion relates
only to the laws of Canada and to international law applicable in Canada as such laws
existed at the time of the writing of this opinion. While we have tried to be as accurate
and comprehensive as possible, this opinion is subject to the following qualifications:
Opinions on the appropriate interpretation and application of international treaty
obligations can never be entirely free from doubt. Such treaties are not the subject of
binding judicial interpretation in domestic and international courts. They are drafted in
the broad and general language of diplomacy, which is appropriate to treaties between
sovereign states, and lack the precision normally found in domestic statutes.
The MAI is an international document that will be authenticated in a variety of official
languages. We have restricted our opinion exclusively to the May 14, 1997 English version
of the MAI.
The proposed MAI creates "The Parties Group" which may interpret the MAI on a
consensus basis. This opinion is made subject to the possible interpretation by this MAI
group as it could provide binding interpretations on the MAI which need not be based on
principles of international law or the MAI itself.
Final Conclusions
Based on the foregoing and having regard to the legal assumptions and
considerations that we deem relevant, we are of the opinion that:
Reservations are unilateral statements made by governments stating that they will not
be bound to an international treaty obligation. Reservations to multilateral agreements
like the MAI can only be made in the manner specified by the terms of the particular
treaty. It is important to note that not all government activities are capable of
reservation under international treaties.
Reservations are a form of exception to international treaty commitments and are
interpreted narrowly by international courts and tribunals. Great care must be taken in
the making of reservations as they will be interpreted strictly by international
tribunals.
(a) Canada's proposed reservation to protect social services such as health and public
education is inadequate to permit provincial governments to continue to provide these
services without compensating affected foreign investors and governments. This reservation
contains provisions which may unduly limit the financial ability of governments to provide
services such as health, public education and childcare.
(b) Canada has not yet proposed a reservation to protect culture or cultural industries.
In light of the decision of recent international trade tribunals, this is an important
area for reservation and leaves Canada exposed to challenge from foreign governments and
foreign investors.
(c) Canada has not proposed any reservations to the MAI to permit it to take measures
to protect or conserve the Canadian environment. Thus, the MAI could reduce the financial
capacity of governments to freely engage in these activities.
Yours very truly,
Appleton & Associates
Barry Appleton LL.B., LL.M.
Managing Partner
 
©Appleton & Associates International
Lawyers, 1997, 1998 All rights reserved.
Please note the terms under
which this information is provided to you
NOTES
1. An exception to an international
treaty is a provision which permits all the signatories to an international agreement to
take actions that would otherwise conflict with the treaty.
2. This rule is set out in Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.1155 U.N.T.S. 331[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
3. See discussion on this topic in Ian Brownlie. Principles
of Public International Law (4th ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990) at 608 - 611.
4. Article 2(1)(d).
5. DAFFE/MAI (97) 1/REV 2.
6. John Jackson. World Trade Law and the Law of the
GATT (Charlottesville: Michie, Publishing, 1969) at pp 71 - 72.
7. For example, on the entry of the Agreement into
force.
8. See John Jackson. The World Trading System:
Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge, MA., MIT Press; 1989)
at 118 - 119.
9. MAI p. 154 par. 4.
10. NAFTA annex II, Schedule of Canada at II-C-1.
11. NAFTA annex II, Schedule of Canada at II-C-2.
12. NAFTA annex II, Schedule of Canada at II-C-3 and
II-C-5.
13. NAFTA annex II, Schedule of Canada at II-C-8.
14. NAFTA annex II, Schedule of Canada at II-C-9.
15. MAI p. 154 par. 6.
16. For example, a government may wish to reserve a
measure that came into law after the MAI came into force but that reflected an earlier
government policy. Without a definition of the term "measure," it may not be
possible to effectively reserve such a policy.
17. Competence of the General Assembly For The
Admission Of A State To The United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 8 (Advisory
Opinion).
18. This approach has been referred to as the
Principle of Effectiveness.
19. Interpretation of Article 79 of the 1947
Peace Treaty (French/Italian Conciliation Commission) XIII, UNRIAA 397. Case
Concerning Certain German Interests in Upper Silesia PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, p. 56 and Free
City of Danzig case, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 65 at 71.
20. For example see the restrictive positions taken
by GATT/WTO panels in United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna DS21/R and
United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline. WT/DS/9.
21. DAFE/MAI/RES(97)15 dated February 24, 1997.
22. It should be noted that the Mexican and American
reservations, unlike Canada's, do not extend to reserving against most-favoured-nation
treatment.
23. Inside NAFTA, Nov. 29, 1995.
24. Draft USTR Guidelines for U.S. States' NAFTA
Service Reservations: Guidelines for NAFTA Non-Conforming State Measures, published in Inside
NAFTA, November 29, 1995 at 18.
25. Case concerning the application of the
Convention of 1902 governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden),
[1958] I.C.J. 55.
26. R. Dolzer & M. Stevens, Bilateral
Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) at 104.
27. Abi-Saab, "Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources and Economic Activities," in International Law: Achievements
and Prospects, ed. M. Bedjaoudi (1991) at 609.
28. Other than tax incentives such as tax credits or
accelerated depreciation.
29. MAI p. 167.
30. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Article 2005.
These articles detail obligations regarding retransmission rights and print-in Canada
publishing requirements.
31. Canada - Certain Measures Relative to
Periodicals, Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R, June 30, 1997 at 28.
32. For example, in 1995, Canada extended its
maritime jurisdiction to the entire Grand Banks in order to conserve fish stocks in the
wake of extreme fragility. In 1970, Canada also unilaterally asserted jurisdiction to the
environmental protection of Arctic waters that were beyond its then-100 mile jurisdiction.
33. United States - Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, adopted Nov. 7, 1989, BISD 36S/345.
34. Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes. GATT Doc. DS10/R, adopted Nov. 1990, BISD 37S/200.
35. In coming to this conclusion, the panel relied
on a report from the World Health Organization that found that non-trade discriminatory
measures such as product labeling or advertising bans could limit the health risk. Relying
on the GATT Panel's interpretation on the term "necessary" in the American
dispute on Section 337, the panel in the Thai cigarette case decided that since there was
a way of protecting health in a less-trade distorting manner, the panel held that the Thai
measures were unnecessary and thus GATT-inconsistent.
36. In the Matter of Canada's Landing
Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Final Report of the Panel under
Chapter 18 (Oct. 16, 1989).
37. United States - Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, GATT Panel Report No. DS21/R, (Sept. 3, 1991).
38. Codified in part at 16 USC 1371(a).
39. Trade and the Environment, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27,
1993, at 25, cited in Kelly Jude Hunt, International Agreements in Conflict with
GATT-Greening GATT after the Uruguay Round Agreement, 30 International Lawyer, Spring
1996, at 179.
40. Report of the Panel in Canada - Measures
Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, adopted Mar. 22, 1988, BISD,
35S/114.
41. Report of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Chapter 1 - "Preamble"
(adopted 12 August 1992) at para. 1.6. See also, M.F. Strong, "Beyond Rio: Prospects
and Portents" 4 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 21 (1993), in which the
author characterizes the Rio Declaration as no more than a statement of principles,
providing a basis for voluntary cooperation and paving the way for the negotiation of
binding agreements. Mr. Strong was UNCED Secretary-General at the Earth Summit, June 1992.
42. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III), Chapter 39 -
"International Legal Instruments and Mechanisms," at paras. 39.3 (d) and (e).
43. Wimbledon (1923), P.C.I.J. Rep., Ser.
a, No. 1.
44. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WTO Panel Report No. WT/DS26/R/USA (18 August 1997) at page 202.
©Appleton & Associates International Lawyers, 1997,
1998 All rights reserved.
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which this information is provided.
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